

Safeguarding our Tribal Nation and Sovereignty

Updated October 30th, 2025

Dossier: Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

Note: Egypt also enabled air-evacuation/medical care for some Gaza patients and brokered ceasefire talks; those humanitarian/diplomatic acts are real. The table isolates acts/omissions with foreseeable *adverse* effects on civilian protection to maintain legal clarity.

Time window	Act or omission (verifiable)	Substantial effect on commissio n	Knowledg e or intent indicators	Proposed mode of liability	Jurisdic tion hook
Oct-Nov	Tight control of Rafah corridor	Materially	Global live	Art. 25(3)(d)	ICC
2023	while hundreds of aid trucks	limited life-	coverage	contribution	territori
	remained stuck in Egypt (Al-	saving	of mass	by policy	al hook
	Arish/Rafah) amid Israel-run	throughput	casualties;	choices	(crimes
	inspection bottlenecks	during peak	Egyptian	sustaining	in Gaza
	(Nitzana/Kerem Shalom). Sources	bombardme	authorities	conditions of	on
	(examples):	nt;	actively	life inflicting	State
	https://www.reuters.com/world/m	foreseeable	coordinati	harm.	Party
	iddle-east/aid-trucks-rush-	worsening	ng flows		territory
	towards-rafah-border-crossing-	of civilian	while).
	gaza-2023-10-21/,	harm.	backlogs		
	https://www.reuters.com/world/m		persisted.		
	iddle-east/aid-piles-up-near-				
	egypts-border-gaza-2023-10-22/,				
	https://www.reuters.com/world/m				
	iddle-east/aid-gaza-slowly-				



	trickles-after-crossing-reopens- 2023-12-18/				
Oct 2023	Protest restrictions and arrests around Cairo pro-Gaza demonstrations, including detentions near Tahrir. Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-detains-protesters-gaza-supporters-cairo-2023-10-20/	Chilled transnation al solidarity capable of escalating immediate pressure to halt operations.	Same-day wire reporting; interior security posture document ed.	Art. 25(3)(d) contribution to persecution (severe deprivation of assembly/ex pression).	Same.
Nov-Dec 2023	Continued volatile/insufficient aid flows under Egypt-mediated screening regimes; repeated stoppages during political rows. Example: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/aid-gaza-slowly-trickles-after-crossing-reopens-2023-12-18/	Kept humanitaria n throughput unreliable and low; predictable aggravation of civilian risk.	Public briefings acknowled ged constraints during mass-casualty period.	Art. 25(3)(d) contribution by policy maintenance with foreseeable effects.	Same.
Jan 2024	Aid still impeded by inspection/command architecture largely dependent on Israeli clearance; Egypt operating as gatekeeper/mediator rather than opening unilateral corridors. (Context reinforced by Dec link above and continuing UN/OCHA situation updates.)	Maintained structural dependence that limited surge capacity while siege persisted.	Ongoing official statement s acknowled ging limitations amid famine warnings.	Art. 25(3)(d) omission to use available leverage to alter throughput model.	Same.
Feb 2024	Construction of a concrete wall/enclosure in North Sinai	Increased pressure on	Satellite analysis	Art. 25(3)(d) contribution	Same (plus



	reportedly to contain a potential mass influx from Gaza (satellite imagery & reporting). Sources: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/16/egypt-building-wall-border-gaza-refugees-satellite-images, https://apnews.com/article/gaza-egypt-wall-refugees-sinai-2024-02-16, https://www.ft.com/content/5c7f3cbd-3a90-4865-8f8e-3e8758b4a10c	trapped civilians; signalled tolerance of removal scenarios; lowered diplomatic cost of further expulsions.	and internation al reporting contempor aneous with mass casualties.	to persecution (severe deprivation of movement); contribution to forcible transfer risk environment.	potenti al univers al jurisdict ion for persecu tion).
May 2024	Refusal to coordinate directly with Israel at Rafah after IDF seized the crossing; Rafah remained shut; aid rerouted via Kerem Shalom. Sources: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-refuses-coordinate-with-israel-rafah-crossing-officials-say-2024-05-28/, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-says-no-aid-through-its-rafah-crossing-with-gaza-until-security-situation-2024-05-24/	Prolonged choke point during active operations; materially worsened humanitaria n conditions.	Reuters noted the stance; famine and displacem ent warnings were public.	Art. 25(3)(d) contribution by omission sustaining impediments during acute phase.	Same.
2023–2025	Border stoppages and ad-hoc reopenings linked to political disputes and security events; unpredictable access continued. (See Reuters chronology above.)	Impeded sustained delivery of medical/foo d/water; foreseeable	Repeated internation al appeals; Egyptian briefings acknowled	Art. 25(3)(d).	Same.



2023–2025 (speech/as sembly)	Sustained constraints on rallies and media concerning Gaza within Egypt during escalating atrocities (arrests, tight protest permitting). Example baseline: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-detains-protesters-gaza-supporters-cairo-2023-10-20/	degradation of protection. Contributed to the regional information blackout and suppression of pressure campaigns.	ging constraints Document ed enforceme nt and arrests.	Contribution to persecution (Art. 25(3)(d)).	Same.
2024–2025 (energy)	Regional gas flows to Egypt/Jordan repeatedly influenced by conflict disruptions; Egypt retained leverage via energy interconnects and terminals but did not deploy coercive measures against belligerent backers. Context: https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-gas-exports-jordan-rise-2025-07-07/	Non-use of available energy leverage reduced potential regional coercive pressure during operations.	Public energy market reporting during war period.	Art. 25(3)(d) omission (failure to use available leverage), effect analysis.	Same.
2023–2025 (diplomacy)	Egypt mediated repeatedly but kept the gatekeeper model, coordination channels that preserved the siege architecture rather than forcing a rights-based corridor breakthrough (see Reuters aid chokepoint links above).	Preserved structures that insulated the perpetrating state from immediate external coercion while mass	Constant public mediation while casualties mounted; knowledge is incontrove rtible.	Art. 25(3)(d) contribution by policy choice with foreseeable effects.	Same.



	harm		
	continued.		